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Agent-based simulation for symmetric electricity market
considering price-based demand response
Ziqing JIANG1, Qian AI1
Abstract With the development of electricity market
mechanism and advanced metering infrastructure (AMI),
demand response has become an important alternative
solution to improving power system reliability and effi-
ciency. In this paper, the agent-based modelling and sim-
ulation method is applied to explore the impact of
symmetric market mechanism and demand response on
electricity market. The models of market participants are
established according to their behaviors. Consumers’
response characteristics under time-of-use (TOU) mecha-
nism are also taken into account. The level of clearing price
and market power are analyzed and compared under
symmetric and asymmetric market mechanisms. The
results indicate that the symmetric mechanism could
effectively lower market prices and avoid monopoly.
Besides, TOU could apparently flatten the overall demand
curve by enabling customers to adjust their load profiles,
which also helps to reduce the price.
Keywords Agent-based simulation, Demand response,
Electricity market, Trading mechanism
1 Introduction
The electricity industry worldwide is undergoing signifi-
cant changes, gradually evolving from a centralized industry
into a distributed and competitive industry. The restructure
has necessitated the decomposition of the three components
of power system: generation, transmission and distribution
[1]. This decomposition begins typically at the supply side,
which separates the power producers and the transmitting
network by establishing independent power plants (IPPs)
and the independent system operator (ISO). In the deregu-
lated environment, generation companies (GenCos) compete
for selling energy by submitting competitive bids to ISO,
significantly changing the traditional pattern.
However, in markets where only the supply side is
restructured, the pricing mechanism is not maturely
developed. ISO only accepts bids from GenCos, and the
load demand was regarded as a constant value depending
on load forecast. End users cannot choose but to passively
accept the result. Because the price remains unchanged or
little changed in the long term, the response potential of
consumers is not motivated, and the elasticity is, if any,
extremely low [2]. Obviously this could cause many
problems, such as the abuse of market power [3, 4] and a
large investment in the long run [5].
In symmetric electricity markets where ISO accepts bids
from both GenCos and retailers, the clearing price is
decided by both sides, thus the competition mechanism is
more complete. On the other hand, demand response (DR),
considered as an important alternative solution to improv-
ing power system reliability and avoiding surging prices,
enables customers to manage load consumption in response
to ever-changing supply conditions[6, 7]. DR programs can
also be implemented under some critical circumstances to
prevent the system from collapsing [8]. Nowadays,
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electricity markets in many countries have incorporated
DR programs, such as the emergency response service and
economic DR programs in PJM market [9, 10], and load
resources participation in fast responding regulation ser-
vice in ERCOT [11], etc.
As an effective approach to studying distributed system,
multi-agent computational economic simulation has been
widely applied in the research of electricity markets
[12–14]. Reference [15] presented an integrative method to
evaluate different wholesale market rules and the effect of
market power mitigation. Reference [16] modeled the
market power in forward and spot electricity markets using
agent-based models. Reference [17] applied two experi-
mental economics methods to a market test suite and dis-
cussed the market outcomes under both methods to
illustrate the difference between the behavior of human and
agents. The new agent-based wholesale market model
presented in [18] uses predictive bidding method and
multi-step optimization to find bidding curves, which
maximize the expected discounted profit. The work
described above mainly focused on wholesale market
issues. However, the difference between trading mecha-
nisms is not compared and the role of retailers is not
incorporated. References [19–21] developed a multi-agent
simulator of competitive electricity market considering
virtual power plant to study possible trading mechanisms,
but only gave a rough comparison between symmetric and
asymmetric markets.
Recently, many researches have been conducted to
study DR characteristics using agent-based approach.
References [22] and [23] proposed the bidding strategy of
GenCos and load serving entities (LSEs) respectively.
However, consumers’ responsive characteristics, namely
how end users react to the time-varying prices, were not
modeled and analyzed under market environment. Refer-
ence [24] modeled the consumption behavior of commer-
cial buildings, and studied the impact from commercial
buildings with price-responsive demand with different
levels of DR penetration, but only GenCo agents were
equipped with learning algorithms. Reference [25] pre-
sented a concept of a new market role, the ‘‘Decentralized
Market Agent’’, which optimized the system operation and
expansion on distribution grid level using demand side
management. However, the relationship and interaction
between market participants are not described clearly.
As the electricity market develops, the participation of
retailers and the response from end customers are playing
an increasingly important role in price forming and market
operation. Therefore, more specific research and analysis
should be done to describe its impact, as well as the
interaction between different participants.
This paper applies agent-based modelling and simula-
tion method to explore the impact of symmetric market
mechanism and price-based DR on electricity markets. The
overall simulation framework is presented in Fig. 1.
Firstly, the trading and clearing mechanism in the sym-
metric day-ahead market is introduced in Section 2, as well
as the simulation procedure. The relationship between
different market participants is also described. In Sec-
tion 3, the detailed models of market participants are
established according to their behaviors: describing the
bidding behavior of IPPs with cost-based bidding strategy
and reinforcement learning algorithm; designing the deci-
sion-making method of retailers from two aspects, namely
purchasing and selling electricity; and taking into account
the response characteristics of consumers under time-of-
use mechanism (TOU) based on consumer psychology.
Finally, the level of clearing prices and market power is
analyzed and compared under different market structures,
as well as the variation in prices, load consumption and
social welfare.
2 Simulation for symmetric electricity market
2.1 Trading mechanism
Day-ahead symmetric markets adopt pool trading pat-
tern and TOU pricing mechanism. The market structure is
shown in Fig. 2. 24 hours within one day are divided into
three periods (i.e. peak period, flat period and valley per-
iod). The prices are different between the three periods,
according to the supply and demand conditions.




































Fig. 2 Market structure
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In day-ahead markets, ISO defines a time point before
which bids can be accepted. GenCos submit the bids before
the deadline, which should include the quantity of elec-
tricity supplied and the price. Similarly, buyers, usually
referring to large consumers and retailers, are also required
to submit offers. Then the supply curve and the demand
curve can be obtained. The crossing point of the two curves
is the market equilibrium point. All the bids from GenCos
which are lower than or equal to the clearing price will be
accepted, and GenCos will arrange its production plan
according to the clearing result. The clearing price is
decided by both sides, so both the high bids from sellers
and the low offers from buyers will result in a decrease in
the profit or dissatisfaction of the load demand, which helps
to lower down the price level.
2.2 Price clearing
When solving out the market clearing price in real
markets, relevant constraints should be considered in order
to ensure the safe operation of the system [26]. At present,
there are many solutions to this problem, including merit-
order method, linear programming and dynamic program-
ming [27]. This paper adopts the multi-period linear pro-
gramming method.
In markets where only the wholesale competition exists,
the objective function is to minimize the overall purchasing
fee, while in markets where the wholesale competition and



















where F1 is the purchasing fee; F2 is the social welfare; T is
the total simulation time horizon; Bi;t is the bid of GenCo i
at time t, and Ci;B is the cost to generate that amount of
energy; kt is the system clearing price at time t; and Dj;t is
the offer of retailer j at time t.
The constraints associated with this optimal problem
include supply-demand balance, unit capacity, unit ramp
rate, transmission line capacity, etc.
2.3 Interaction between market participants
In the simulation model of day-ahead market proposed
in this paper, agents representing different market partici-
pants interact with each other to pursue the maximization
of their own profits. The market information is incomplete,
meaning that agents do not have access to the strategies of
others.
In perfect competition markets, all GenCo agents bid
according to their real cost, while in more realistic sce-
narios, some GenCos may have dominant market power so
they could manipulate market price by capacity withhold-
ing. However, the pressure from retailers could force
GenCos to make a reasonable evaluation of clearing prices,
because high bids may cause a loss in market share.
On the other hand, the profit of retailers equals the
revenue minus the purchasing cost. The retail price could
greatly influence the consumption of end users. The
decrease in consumption, in turn, could also affect the
profits of retailers and GenCos. In markets where the price
is time-varying, customers could cut down their expenses
by adjusting their load plans. As a consequence, the rev-
enue retailers earn may decline.
From another perspective, however, the rearrangement
of load may cause market prices to rise in peak hours and
drop in valley ones. Similar changes can be seen in the
purchasing cost of retailers, and the total cost within one
day will decrease to some extent. During this interaction
process, the overall production cost is also reduced.
2.4 Simulation procedures
During the simulation, GenCo agents and retailer agents
will continue adjusting their bidding strategies, while
customers adjusting their load profiles, until an equilibrium
point is reached, which usually takes dozens of rounds. The
procedure of a single simulation round is as follows.
1) GenCo agents apply decision-making approach, which
is based on unit parameters and known market
information, to obtain the best bidding strategy, then
submit the multi-period bids to ISO according to the
predefined format.
2) Retailer agents conduct the load forecast based on the
load characteristics of consumers, determine the
quantity needed and the price, and submit the offer.
3) After receiving all the bids, ISO applies clearing
algorithm to work out the market prices at each period,
as well as successful bids and offers.
4) GenCos calculate the generation cost and expected
profit, which are used as the feedback to improve the
decision-making.
5) Retailers calculate their purchasing cost based on the
clearing result, and determine the retail price.
6) Customers purchase electricity from retailers, and
respond to price signals by adjusting the load profile.
7) Retailers calculate the profit and apply Roth-Erev (R-
E) algorithm to improve the decision-making.
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3 Agent models of market participants
3.1 GenCo agents
The model is made up of three modules: the calculation
of generation cost, the selection of bidding strategy and the
learning algorithm.
The unit cost function can be expressed using a ladder
diagram, as shown in Fig. 3. Let b be the number of seg-
ments, q be the quantity generated, and p be the corre-
sponding cost, then it can be written as:
C ¼ ðp1; q1Þ; ðp2; q2Þ;    ; ðpb; qbÞf g ð3Þ
The bid is based on the cost function [28]. Let A be the
set of alternative strategies, of which the elements, also
called strategy coefficients, refer to the value deviating
from the cost.
A ¼ fA0;A1;A2;    ;Amg ð4Þ
where m is the number of strategies; A0 ¼ 0, meaning that
units bid the marginal cost.
In this way, the bidding function of GenCo i, for a
certain Ai, can be expressed as:
fðAip1; q1Þ; ðAip2; q2Þ;    ; ðAipb; qbÞg ð5Þ
Once the cost function has been confirmed, the key to
GenCos’ strategy is to select an appropriate strategy
coefficient in order to maximize the profit.
The electricity market is modeled as a repetitive auction,
which can be studied through repeated stochastic bidding.
We adopt the roulette wheel method for GenCo agents to
randomly select Ai, and R-E reinforcement learning algo-
rithm to model agents’ learning behavior.
According to the R-E algorithm, selection probabilities
and propensities will be continuously updated on the basis
of the historic profit. If strategy Ak was chosen in the dth
round, and the profit earned is Pd, the probabilities and
propensities can be updated through
qi;dþ1 ¼ ð1 rÞqi;d þ Ri;d ð6Þ
Ri;d ¼
ð1 eÞPd i ¼ k
Pd















where qi;dþ1 and pi;dþ1 are the propensity and the proba-
bility of strategy i in the ðd þ 1Þth round, respectively; Ri;d
is the response factor; r is the forgetting rate; c is the
cooling coefficient; and e is the experience factor.
3.2 Retailer agents
A retailer, which can be viewed as an aggregate of
consumers, is in charge of the power supply in a certain
region. This aggregate way makes it easier to maximize the
profits of overall consumers [29]. Being a retailer does not
entail large physical assets, so the market access threshold
is relatively lower. They make profits by purchasing energy
from GenCos and selling it to consumers in a higher price.
Numbers of retailers could significantly increase the com-
petition. Generally speaking, it is impossible for every
single retailer to occupy a strong share of the market,
which leaves no room for monopoly, the market operation
efficiency thus improved.
The entire purchasing cost can be expressed as:
Cpur ¼ Cgen þ Ctran þ Ccong ð9Þ
where Cgen is the cost of purchasing energy from GenCos;
Ctran is the cost of electricity transmission; and Ccong is the
congestion cost when congestion occurs.
The decision-making process of retailer agents contains
two parts: determining the purchasing offer and the retail
price, respectively. This paper adopts derivative following
method to work out the purchasing price, and still applies
the roulette wheel method and R-E algorithm to settle the
retail price.
The derivative following method adjusts its offer by
making a small change to the price offered in the previous
round. The adjustment is based on the revenue earned
previously and the difference between the current result
and the expected result. If the price offered before cannot
guarantee all the demand to be satisfied, agents will raise
the offer until all the energy needed is bought. Further-
more, if the previous adjustment produced more revenue
per good than the previous period, then a similar change,
otherwise a different one, will be made.
We assume that the price offered in round i is pRi , the









Fig. 3 Cost curve of units
Ziqing JIANG, Qian AI
123
pRiþ1 ¼ pRi þ Diþ1 ð10Þ




0 qpur qexp ð12Þ
where qpur is the quantity purchased; qexp is the quantity
needed; a and b are relevant coefficients, related to the
changing rate of Di. Di changes every round, decided by the
difference between the quantity needed and purchased.
The selling price is:
psell ¼ Cpur þ pser ð13Þ
0 pser pmax  Cpur ð14Þ
where pser is the fee charged by retailers for energy pro-
vision service, decided by the random bidding method
discussed before, usually accounting for 0.5%*5.0% of
the total price; and pmax is the maximum price value.
3.3 Consumer agents with DR behaviour
The objective of consumer agents is to minimize the
expense without jeopardizing their load demand. For that
purpose, customers would modify their original load profile
to consume more energy in low-price periods and less
energy in high-price periods. In this section, we apply
consumer psychology theory to model the responsive
characteristics of agents under TOU pricing mechanism.
The mathematical model of this mechanism is shown in
Fig. 4.
The general impact of the price change on consumers’
electricity consumption is illustrated in Fig. 5. Consumers
would not respond if the price change is less than a certain
threshold value (point a). As the change increases above it,
customers will adjust their load consumption accordingly.
The quantity adjusted has an approximate linear relation to
the price incentive. However, there is a limit to users’
response ability, which reflects the rigid demand. Point b in
Fig. 5 is defined as the limit value above which the stim-
ulation loses effect. As is shown in the figure, the
responsive characteristics curve is mainly decided by the
threshold value, the slope and the limit value.
Load shift rate is defined as the ratio of the load trans-
ferred from high-price periods to low-price periods, divi-
ded by the load in high-price periods. For example, the
peak-valley load shift rate lpv can be expressed by (15).
lpv ¼
0 0Dkpv\apv





where Dkpv is the difference between the price in peak
hours and that in valley hours; apv is the threshold value;
bpv is the limit value; lmaxpv is the maximum response; and
kpv is the slope.
The peak-flat shift rate lpf and the flat-valley shift rate
lfv can be expressed by similar equations. We assume that
the load transferred from one period to another is evenly
distributed by hours, as indicated in (16)-(18).
DLpvðkÞ ¼ DLpvðkþ1Þ ¼    ¼ DLpvðkþNvÞ ¼ DLpv ð16Þ
DLvpðkÞ ¼ DLvpðkþ1Þ ¼    ¼ DLvpðkþNpÞ ¼ DLvp ð17Þ
DLpvNv ¼ DLvpNp ð18Þ
where Nv and Np are the numbers of valley hours and peak
hours, respectively; DLpvðkÞ is the load increment at the kth
valley hour caused by the load shift; and DLvpðkÞ is the load
decrement at the kth peak hour.
According to the model proposed, the load after
adjustment can be obtained by (19).
Lt ¼
Lt0 þ lpv Lp þ lfv Lf t 2 Tv
Lt0 þ lpf Lp  lfv Lf t 2 Tf





where Tp; Tf ; Tv are peak, flat and valley hours respec-
tively; Lt0 and Lt are the load at hour t before and after
TOU is implemented; Lp and Lf are the average peak-hour
load and valley-hour load, respectively.
The entire group of consumers can be divided into three
types (i.e., industrial, commercial and household), the





















Fig. 5 Consumers’ responsive characteristics
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variation in the parameters. Factors affecting the parame-
ters of the responsive model include the business type,
production procedure, and the proportion of electricity cost
in total cost, etc. [30]. For example, in iron manufacturing
industry, high electricity quality and reliability are
required, and the proportion of shiftable load is limited.
Thus the maximum shift rate and limit value are relatively
small. In contrast, cement enterprises usually work on three
shifts, and the electricity expense makes up approximately
15% of total expense. In this case, they are more willing to
transfer load for the purpose of cutting down electricity
fees, and the limit value and the maximum rate are larger.
As for commercial and domestic users, a large part of
electricity is consumed by air conditioning and lighting
equipment, of which the response potential is considerable.
As a result, the maximum load shift rate of which is rela-
tively larger, as well as the threshold value and the limit
value.
4 Case study
In this section, Java-based multi-agent simulation plat-
form ‘‘Repast’’ is used to simulate day-ahead electricity
markets. The generator parameters are shown in Table 1.
In this case, bidding segments are assumed to be 4, the
number of available strategies to be 10 and the price cap to
be 1.2 times the marginal cost. The electricity is traded on
the system clearing price. Segmented cost information of
units is shown in Table 2, and the typical load curve is in
Fig. 6. There are five retailers in the market, whose load
information in each period are presented in Table 3. The
separation of periods is shown in Table 4. In the region
studied, the proportions of industrial load, commercial load
and domestic load are 60%, 25%, 15%, respectively. Based
on the analysis in [31, 32], the parameters of customers’
responsive models are set. Given the fact that the
automation level of industrial users is relatively higher than
that of commercial and residential users, the parameters of
the former are generally larger.
The asymmetric market is simulated first, where only
bids from GenCos are accepted. Figure 7 shows how the
valley-hour clearing price fluctuates during the simulation,
while the change in the selection probability of GenCo 4’s
optimal action is demonstrated in Fig. 8. At the beginning,
the price keeps fluctuating up and down due to the random
bidding strategy of GenCos, and the selection probability
changes slowly. But the probability value, which is
Table 1 Generator parameters
















1 1 40 80 80 80 8 4 12
2 2 60 120 120 120 8 4 12
3 3 60 120 120 120 8 4 12
4 4 66 132 132 132 10 4 12
Table 2 Segmented cost of GenCos




0.12 45*70 80*95 72*90
0.13 70*90 95*110
0.14 50*60 90*120













Fig. 6 Typical daily load curve
Ziqing JIANG, Qian AI
123
continuously updated through the simulation, goes up
swiftly after dozens of rounds. In the meantime, the price
also gradually converges to a certain value.
Table 5 demonstrates the optimal bids and profits of
GenCos when the equilibrium has been reached, where
‘‘?’’ means the price added on the basis of marginal cost.
Shown from the results, GenCo 4 seizes a strong share of
market. Its marginal cost is the lowest, so it could commit
market power by bidding much higher than the cost. On the
other hand, in order to maintain enough revenue, other
GenCos also have to raise their bids because their shares
are much smaller. As a result, the market price is obtained
at a relatively high level.
To investigate the impact of market power on price, the
case with ten GenCos is also simulated, whose result shows
an apparent decline in clearing prices. Since more GenCos
increase the competition, every particular one is less likely
to seize a dominant market share. As a consequence, the
price is closer to the system marginal cost.
Next, the symmetric market is simulated and the prices
in different scenarios are compared in Fig. 9. As can be
seen, the participation of buyers’ could lead to a further
drop in market prices, in contrast with the other two sce-
narios. GenCos are forced to lower down their bids in order
to avoid a loss in market share, as shown in Table 6.
Accordingly, the prices are lower than those in the asym-
metric market. In addition, the selling prices set by five
retailers are also presented in Fig. 10.
Table 3 Information of retailers
No Number of consumers Average valley-hour load (MW) Average flat-hour load (MW) Average peak-hour load (MW)
1 100 36 49 58
2 120 43 58 70
3 130 47 63 76
4 90 33 44 52
5 85 31 41 49
Table 4 Separation of periods
Hour segmentation Time range
Peak hours 08:00—12:00, 17:00—21:00
Flat hours 12:00—17:00, 21:00—24:00
Valley hours 00:00—08:00
Table 5 Profits and optimal bids of GenCos
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Fig. 8 Fluctuation of selection probability
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Changes in prices and electricity consumption after the
implementation of TOU mechanism are presented in
Fig. 11 and Fig.12, respectively. Customers rearrange their
load schedule by shifting load from high-price hours to
low-price ones, as response to the period-varying prices.
The load adjustment causes similar change in prices. A
gradual decrease can be seen of the peak-hour price. On the
contrary, the prices in flat and valley hours experience
different levels of growth. Besides, the total load con-
sumption slightly rises, so do the profits of retailers, as
shown in Table 7.
5 Conclusion
This paper proposes a multi-agent simulation model of
symmetric electricity market to study the impact of
trading mechanisms and DR on electricity market. Agent
models of different market players are established
according to their behavior. Moreover, the response
characteristics of customers based on consumer psychol-
ogy are also presented. The numerical analysis compares
the results where there are four and ten units in the
market and discusses the impact of market power on the
clearing price. By comparing the simulation results of
symmetric and asymmetric cases, it can be seen that the
participation of retailers could effectively lower down
clearing prices and avoid monopoly. Besides, the imple-
mentation of TOU could encourage consumers to adjust
their original load profiles by shifting load from peak
hours to off-peak hours, which also has a similar effect on
market prices.
In future work, we will further improve the agent model
of consumers by taking into account more factors affecting
the response characteristics, such as user satisfaction and
interaction between different customers.
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Table 6 Comparison of GenCos’ bids in different mechanisms





Table 7 Profit information of retailers
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Fig. 10 Selling prices of retailers
Fig. 11 Price change during simulation
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